Duct tape is a very useful item, as in the construction of a Kearny Fallout Meter or sealing cracks in your ``safe room.'' You should buy some-but don't count on it for protection against the threat whose name the government fears to speak.
``Dirty bombs'' are mentioned, of course. Such bombs are much easier to construct than an atomic bomb. But what are the real nuclear hazards?
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), more than 550 incidents of illicit nuclear trafficking have been reported since 1993-16 of which involved material that could be turned into atomic bombs. The worst threat comes from the stockpile of 600 tonnes of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium not already incorporated into warheads that is stored at weapons labs, civilian research centers, and naval shipyards. This material may be travelling down a ``nuclear Silk road'' to North Korea, Iran, and Iraq (Science 2001;292:1632-1636).
Concerns that Saddam Hussein has all the components needed to construct a nuclear weapon have been expressed for years (CBN News 8/21/00).
Some have asserted unequivocally that terrorist nukes exist, ranging in weight from 30 to 150 pounds, and small enough to fit in a small wheeled carry-on suitcase. The smallest such warhead, with a yield of 50 to 100 tons, could disable an aircraft carrier from radiation alone, if exploded within a few hundred yards. There are many potential sources of weapons, including organized crime groups said to be formed and still managed by the KGB (Douglass J, Cohen S, WorldNetDaily 11/8/01).
In 1998, a defector from Russian military intelligence testified that the Russians had pre-positioned weapons, including small nuclear devices, in the U.S. and other nations, to be detonated in time of war (Horrock N, UPI 12/21/01).
The U.S. has strengthened its program for detecting radioactive materials, with wider deployment of instruments formerly used only by mobile Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NEST). There are physical limits, however, to the ability to detect radiation through distance and shielding (Washington Post 3/3/02).
For protecting the population from radiation effects in the event of a detonation, the government provides little information (see www.ready.gov/radiation.html) and no technology. Survival is up to you.
The ``dirty bomb'' is not an effective weapon of war, but could be a weapon of terror (Hamza K, Wall St J 6/12/02). The use of dynamite to disperse cesium-137 or cobalt-60-which could be stolen from a hospital-would cause some casualties from the explosion. The next most important cause of death would probably be panic. As S. Fred Singer has observed, producing significant radioactivity over an area of 1 square mile would require an initial concentration within the bomb 10 million times higher, more than enough to quickly kill the terrorists trying to assemble it. Moreover, it would generate enough heat to melt most containers.
According to Larry Grimm, senior health physicist at UCLA, the biggest concern from a radiological dispersion device would be the expense of clean-up. He recommends the standard protection measures: contamination control, distance, shielding, and time. As radiation levels would be low, his advice is to ``help others first.'' Then put distance, say 300 yards, between yourself and the radiation. ``Do not `head for the hills.' Leave the roadways open so emergency responders can get through.'' Remove contaminated clothing, shower (without vigorous scrubbing), and take shelter (full article posted at www.oism.org/ddp).
Nuclear power plants are on high alert-thus we will probably not be able to arrange a tour of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station during our annual meeting. However, even under worst case scenarios, the laws of physics would prevent terrorists from being able to cause more than a few (if any) casualties by targeting such a facility (Chapin DM, et al. Nuclear power plants and their fuel as terrorist targets. Science 2002;297:1997-1998). Shutting down the power grid would be far more devastating.
Acknowledging that the containment building could not be breached by running a jet aircraft into it, alarmists focus on the pool where spent fuel rods are stored. However, ``spent fuel pool radioactivity has lost the short-lived and most volatile products and has insufficient energy to disperse in hazardous forms. Even hupothesized zirconium fires would only burn cladding and structures, external to the fuel, adding little to the radioactivity release'' (Science 2003;299:201-203).
A General Electric study showed that even 1,000 tons of high explosives delivered by a small plane crashing into the pool would not disrupt fuel assemblies, which are under 9 or more feet of water, and that the potential for off-site radiation release is negligible (from CFRI General Position Paper GPP4).
The Science article was drafted by Dr. Ed Zebroski, winner of the 2002 Edward Teller Award, after reading the widespread phrase ``Mobile Chernobyls'' used in the media for fuel shipping casks. ``It struck me that this was worth noting as a record-breaking exaggeration (say 100 million fold on a risk scale of likely consequences), and that claims of vulnerability of nuclear facilities to disruption by large airplanes also seemed greatly exaggerated.... Misinformation on risks it itself a risk of multiplying the panic effects of any real attack that might occur.''
Antinuclear alarmists have also focused attention on depleted uranium (DU), used in armor and in tank-penetrating 30-mm ammunition (CovertAction winter 2001). It came into extensive use in the Gulf War and in Kosovo. DU is almost pure U-238, from which its 14 radioactive daughters and U-235 have been removed. It is thus much less radioactive than natural uranium. The surface soil in Kosovo (1-cm deep) emits about 100,000,000 MBq, or 300 times the dose emitted by all the DU that was dispersed in Kosovo (Jaworoski Z, Bate R, junkscience.com 1/10/01).
Radiation protection standards for DU are based on its chemical toxicity, which is similar to that of other heavy metals. The major toxic effect of DU in air and food is chemical impairment of renal function. There is no evidence that DU causes leukemia; the incidence of leukemia in Kosovo soldiers fits the European norm.
Some state that the furor over DU is Russian-generated propaganda intended to split the U.S. from NATO allies (Lunev S, NewsMax.com 1/24/02).
In contrast to the nonhazards or small risks, protection against the really big threat of a nuclear explosion receives little attention either from the press or public health authorities. The American College of Radiology does not cover nuclear weapons in its primer on the response to radiological terrorism. There is, however, a wealth of both technical and practical information accessible to the public.
The best source we have found that offers both information and equipment is radmeters4u.com. In addition to calibrated civil defense instruments from the 1950s and Kearny Fallout Meters, you can purchase a radiation detector for your keyring, covering a range from 0.1 R/hr to >50 R/hr. This NukAlert device, costing from $160 to $135 (in quantity) is ``the most remarkable advance in civil defense equipment in many, many years,'' according to Dr. Arthur Robinson.
Materials produced by the Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine and by Doctors for Disaster Preparedness, including Nuclear War Survival Skills book and videos, Soviet C.D. and other C.D. videos, a complete set of the Fighting Chance Newsletter, Access to Energy (30 years), shelter plans, and DDP meeting tapes (10 years)-a $797 value-is now available from DDP on DVDs for $150. To order, send your mailing address and a check for ``DVDs'' to the address below.
DDP, 1601 N. Tucson Blvd. Suite 9, Tucson, AZ 85716, (520)325-2680, www.oism.org/ddp.